Back to the Future: The FIASCO War
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By Don Capps, U.S.A.
Atlas F1 Columnist
Do you know who won the 1980 Spanish Grand Prix? Can you name the winner of the 1981 South African Grand Prix? By all means, if you're new to the sport or simply can't remember, consult one of those books or web sites containing statistics on the World Drivers' Championship or Formula One. What? These events are not listed? Any idea as to why?
The answer, in a nutshell, is what became known since as The FISA/FOCA War, or in short: The FIASCO War.
The FIASCO War was not the first struggle to mar the racing scene, but it has certainly been one of those pivotal events, much like the American War of the Rebellion or the Second World War. The FIASCO War saw the Federation Internationale de Sport Automobile, FISA, and the Formula One Constructors Association, FOCA, collide head-on into each other in 1980. It was an ugly, nasty period for racing, made more dismal with the on-going battles between the United States Auto Club (USAC) and the Championship Auto Racing Teams (CART) in the United States.
The conflict escalated into open warfare in the Summer of 1980. Naturally, the true origin is perhaps forever lost to the mists of history, but one event which played a role occurred in May 1972. It concerned an issue which usually rests at the bottom of all such conflicts - money; and its usual associate - power. From its formation in November 1964, FOCA began to exercise more and more influence on how things were run in the world of Grand Prix racing. Although some steps had been taken prior to the formation of FOCA to standardize such issues of importance as starting monies, the constructors rarely worked in unison. This generally helped the organizing clubs.
Once the FOCA began to flex its muscle, the Commission Sportive Internationale (CSI) - the previous incarnation of FISA - was generally not inclined to exert either much discipline or direction to counter-balance the FOCA. The drivers often worked in parallel with the FOCA through the Grand Prix Drivers Association (GPDA), but there were some natural frictions between the GPDA and the FOCA which were generally minimized - at least in public.
For the 1972 season, the FOCA had engineered a standard agreement with the organizing clubs which set the size of the field for a Grand Prix championship event at 25 cars. That is, with one exception - Monaco. For Monaco, the field was set at 20. The FOCA stated that this was unsatisfactory, and to make its dissatisfaction clear, the FOCA teams refused to take the track for the practice session until the number of cars in the field was increased to 25. This caught the new president of the Automobile Club of Monaco, Michel Boeri, by surprise. Boeri pointed out that there was a CSI regulation which set the size of the field in the principality at 20 - paragraph B of Article 4, to be exact.
Boeri said that only the CSI could change a CSI regulation, but unfortunately for him, the AC de Monaco had verbally agreed with the FOCA to allow 25 starters two weeks previously. The teams had arrived expecting to field 25 cars only to find that the grid would be only 20 cars, hence the refusal to allow their cars to practice. The FOCA had arrived and expected the AC de Monaco to abide by the standard agreement - the starting monies as determined by the Geneva Scale, the passes, and other stipulations. Indeed, the FOCA management had a telegram from the CSI okaying the new number of starters.
It has to be appreciated just how confusing and complicated and convoluted all this was. The FOCA thought it had a done deal with the AC de Monaco and the CSI. To show up and suddenly find that that deal seemed to have been forgotten got more than a few FOCA members into a low hover with their target acquisition radars set at max. The CSI president, Prince Metternich, was not on the scene so the director of the French national auto sporting authority (the FFSA - Federation Francaise du Sport Automobile) and the French CSI representative, Jacques Blanchet, stepped into the breach to attempt to resolve the issue. Meanwhile Prince Metternich, in Paris, held a press conference and guided the discussion in the direction of other issues which were perhaps the "real" reason behind the decision by the FOCA to be difficult - the safety changes already enacted and those coming for the 1973 season.
After much maneuvering and not a little hardnosed negotiating by the FOCA, Blanchet and Boeri agreed to the FOCA demand for 25-car grid. The FOCA had flexed its muscle and the CSI and the AC de Monaco came off looking like losers. This did not go over well in some quarters, especially in light of the fact that Blanchet stated that the CSI lacked the power to enforce the "only 20 cars for Monaco" provision. Needless to say, Blanchet was a casualty of this incident. An interested observer to all this was a successor to Blanchet as the director of the FFSA - Jean-Marie Balestre.
After the 1972 Monaco race and in preparation for the 1973 season, the organizing clubs formed their own association, Grand Prix International (GPI), to redress what they considered to be an imbalance in the power between the participants in the Grand Prix business. The basic purpose of GPI was to take the FOCA down a few notches. GPI was intended to serve as the representative of the hosting clubs when it came to negotiating the contract with the FOCA for what a weekend would "cost." During 1972, there had been minor skirmishes during the season between FOCA and the hosting clubs over money.
In late 1972, the FOCA and GPI were in the throes of hammering out the terms for the 1973 season. GPI said not a penny over Ј53,000 per weekend, while in contrast the FOCA was asking for not a penny less than Ј103,000 a weekend. GPI gave the FOCA a "take-it-or-leave-it" demand, with a deadline of mid-December. Storm clouds were brewing and lightning crackled at a right dangerous pace as GPI and FOCA glared at each other. To assure unity within its ranks, each member of GPI posted a hefty bond to be forfeited if someone bolted. The FOCA was standing pat because it felt that its trump card was the fact that it "owned" the drivers.
Meanwhile, the CSI looked on with a benign smile after earlier stating that the formation of GPI would result in a more stable situation in the Grand Prix world. Prince Metternich was still basking in the glow of his achievement as a negotiator when the bargaining chips were set at 400,000SF and 438,000SF and he brokered a compromise of 420,000SF. Prince Metternich and the CSI completely missed the fact that the whole game was different this time. The CSI was clearly opting to support the GPI and the FOCA were taking careful note of this fact and how to use it when the fight broke out.
Although GPI voiced the opinion that their offer of 475,000SF was more than fair and represented over a 12% increase from the previous year and that the prize monies offered were more than adequate to offset the demands of the FOCA, the FOCA shot back with a withering message that while the costs of the cars and engines had jumped in the neighborhood of 300% and 600% respectively, the prize monies were the same as they had been in the 1959-1960 period.
As the FOCA dug in its heels, GPI petitioned the CSI for permission to run the events counting towards the World Championship for cars conforming to F1, Formula 5000, the USAC Championship Car formula, and F2. The CSI granted the GPI clubs permission to do so. Both the FOCA and the GPDA questioned the safety of such an action, particularly with the first World Championship event - the Argentinean Grand Prix - little more than a month away.
Then the GPI coalition began to unravel. Those overseas clubs which shouldered the financial costs of transporting the teams to their races had to deal with the FOCA teams concerning those costs. The Argentine club had not joined GPI, so was not really an issue, particularly since it was basically aligned with the GPI principles. However, the travel agreements for the South African race were still being negotiated. This meant that the FOCA had at least two events more or less lined up with it.
The FOCA then dropped one of its trump cards on the table. When the CSI had stepped in at Monaco, it had announced a new set of safety regulations to take effect with the first European event on the calendar, the Spanish Grand Prix. The FOCA asked the question if the announced safety regulations were still set to go into effect with the Spanish race. It also wondered aloud that after making such an issue of safety why was it that the CSI was now willing to allow the fielding of cars which would not meet these new regulations? Was the safety issue merely a canard?
The FOCA announced that it was breaking off negotiations with GPI and would now negotiate directly with the individual organizers, as it had with South Africa. The spokesman for the FOCA on this issue was Max Mosley, one of the founders of March, along with the new owner of Brabham, Bernie Ecclestone. This ploy was one which relied on the long established relationships which existed between the constructors and the clubs. By quietly doing an end run on GPI, the powerbase of the organization simply quietly eroded despite the efforts of the spokesman for GPI, Henri Treu.
Treu, however, did have an inspired idea and approached Enzo Ferrari asking for his help. By this time, the FOCA was already ahead of Treu. Ferrari was not exactly fond of the FOCA, but he also knew a losing hand when he saw one. Treu suddenly had to face the reality that he and GPI had been defeated, and badly, by the FOCA. GPI simply withered away and disappeared. It was clear that the FOCA was the big kahuna on the block. And, by casting its lot with GPI, the CSI was damaged even more in the credibility department.
In 1976, Prince Metternich declined to run once more for the presidency of the CSI. He was replaced by Pierre Ugeux, a Belgian. Like Metternich, Ugeux had his fun-meter pegged after dealing with the FOCA for only two years. In the breach stepped the director of the FFSA, Jean-Marie Balestre. Balestre assumed the presidency of the CSI in late 1978. One of his first acts was to rename the CSI - it was now the FISA. In this manner Balestre began a series of steps with which he began to shift the FISA from a FOCA patsy into an organization ready, willing, and able to do battle with the FOCA, if necessary.
There is a fundamental law in physics which clearly states that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, the result of trying to do so rendering forth a great noise and much debris. This also applies to politics. In 1979 the FISA, with Balestre at the helm, was moving to exert its power against the FOCA, which held the reins thereof, and had no intention to turn them over anybody, the FISA in particular. It was not a question of whether or not there would be a confrontation, simply a matter of when and over what.
The debut of "ground effects" in the form of the Lotus 78 and 79 proved to be the spark which was to cause the showdown between the FISA and the FOCA to come to blows. There were a few warning shots early in the 1979 season that things were going to be different with Balestre at the helm of the FISA. Bernie Ecclestone had moved into the leadership position and lead spokesman of the FOCA at this time. They would not have much of a honeymoon period to get the measure of one another: Balestre determined that John Watson was the culprit responsible for a big shunt at the start of the Argentinean Grand Prix which left five of the original starters on the sideline and unable to participate in the second start. Watson was fined 10,000SF by the FISA, an act which seemed calculated to get the FOCA into a low hover.
As the 1979 season rolled on, Balestre became more and more vocal about the state of Grand Prix racing. In turn, the FOCA was facing the unpleasant fact that turbocharging was apparently here to stay, although they were not deterred by that thought when it came to voicing its opinion about the state of Grand Prix racing. It was apparent that two objects were getting ready to occupy the same space and at the same time. Even the Untrained Eye could see trouble brewing. Soon many were to learn that FISA + FOCA = FIASCO.
During the 1979 season, the relationship between the Federation Internationale de Sport Automobile (FISA) and the Formula One Constructors Association (FOCA) was quiet, subject to moments of strain, and kept out of view of the public as much as possible. Sorta. FISA president Jean-Marie Balestre did slap a hefty fine on John Watson for being responsible for a first lap pile-on. Balestre did utter remarks about the current state of affairs in Grand Prix racing which were not received well in some quarters, particularly those occupied by Bernie Ecclestone and Max Mosley, the major voices of the FOCA. The season managed to be conducted without any serious meltdowns or unseemly public spats. Despite an occasional escalation of the words between the two finding their way into print, few doubted that 1980 would be much different.
When Balestre became president of the FISA, his campaign platform was simple - he was the anti-FOCA candidate. He espoused the idea that the "sporting power" within Grand Prix racing did not rest with the constructors, but with the agent plenipotentiary of the Federation Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) - the FISA. Balestre vowed to restore the balance of power with the sport, the tilt of power towards the FOCA being accomplished during the period in which the predecessor to the FISA, the Commission Sportive Internationale (CSI), was weak and taken advantage of by the questionable tactics of the FOCA. Balestre was determined to redress that balance and with a vengeance.
While the FISA and the FOCA did quibble and squawk about the impact of ground effects on Grand Prix racing, the exchanges were never confrontational and often approached in an indirect fashion. While Balestre was laying the groundwork for a campaign against the FOCA, the FOCA were generally dismissive of both Balestre and the FISA. After all, had they not stared down the previous CSI presidents? Had they not broken the organizers' cartel? Did they not have the backing of the fans?
The FOCA seriously misjudged both Balestre and a revitalized FISA. The issue which was to launch the first skirmishes of the FIASCO War was, naturally, ground effects. Today, ground effects is taken for granted and while somewhat restricted, the diffusers achieve the desired effect rather more elegantly than the sliding skirts that began to appear on each Grand Prix machine after the Lotus 79 dominated the 1978 season. The FOCA teams wanted to retain the current setup using sliding skirts and "stepped" bottoms to create the ground effects which literally sucked the cars towards the track surface. The FISA wanted to eliminate this system and lower the cornering speeds. Two objects moved closer to occupying the same spot at the same time.
After several months of lobbing little cowpats at each other in the early months of 1980, the FISA and the FOCA got down to some serious cowpat tossing in April. The FISA Plenary Conference held in mid-April produced a number of reasons for everyone to return unhappy about something. The FISA Executive Committee met prior to the Plenary Conference and voted upon a number of changes to be implemented starting with 1 January 1981 and continuing to be implemented through the 1983 season. Balestre used as examples the injuries which occurred in the South African Grand Prix at Kyalami - Alain Prost (McLaren) and Marc Surer (ATS), and the Long Beach Grand Prix - Clay Regazzoni (Ensign). Naturally, this got Teddy Mayer wound up and he fired off a strongly worded response to Balestre.
That FISA salvo and its counter-fire from the FOCA, however, were just the signal for the parties to take their posts. During the Plenary Conference the FISA dropped no end of cards on the table. First, citing its authority under the regulations to make changes dictated by safety concerns, the FISA banned the sliding skirts system as of 1 January 1981. Also on that date, other changes were to take effect regarding the frontal structure of the cars and which were to include a deformable structure to protect the legs of the drivers. Also included in this package of safety-related changes were additional protection in the cockpit side walls, changes to the rear wings, an increase in the weight of the cars to 605 kilograms, and the banning of two-stroke or Diesel or Wankel or turbine engines until further notice.
Second, in 1982 tyre widths would be restricted or a tread introduced to lower cornering speeds. Third, for 1983, it introduced the fuel-flow formula proposed by Keith Duckworth of Cosworth. In addition, four-wheel drive was to be banned and the maximum number of wheels on a car to be limited to four, plus regulations would be generated on the use of titanium. Fourth, Balestre made it clear that many of the changes being proposed were courtesy of the Grand Prix Drivers' Association (GPDA). On the circuit safety front, all circuits would have to be inspected and certified before hosting a Grand Prix. The responsibility for starting a race would now be delegated to a single person, FISA delegate Derek Ongaro, this taking effect with the next event, the Belgian Grand Prix.
Also, there would be a mandatory meeting of all drivers 45 minutes after the end of free practice on the morning of each Grand Prix, with the team managers also in attendance. An absent driver would receive a $2,000 fine for the first absence and a $5,000 fine for the second such absence. Henceforth, except in the case of force majeure, any driver changes had to be submitted four weeks in advance. In addition, all documents relating to a team had to bear the name of the constructor and not just that of the commercial sponsor of the team.
The FISA Executive Committee also submitted to the Plenary Conference something that slipped past most, but was a red star cluster to the FOCA. In a statement buried within all these changes, the FISA put it very bluntly what it intended to do:
"…the FISA exerts full control over the World Championships belong to it and which, at the present moment, are the subject of a takeover by certain private associations foreign to the FIA.
"No constructor or association of constructors may organize or be associated with a national sporting authority (or club affiliated to that ASN) for the organization of a Grand Prix.
"No competitor or constructor entered for a World Championship event may be organizer of this same event."
And just to round out the day's activities, Balestre suspended the running of the 1981 South African Grand Prix. The rationale for his decision was that he and other FISA officials were denied access to the podium at Kyalami by the security guards assigned to that duty by the race sponsor. Balestre claimed that "physical violence" was used to deny him access to the podium, but that could simply be something lost in the translation.
As many went to great pains to point out, these were "suggestions" from the FISA Executive Committee and were not adopted as of yet by the FISA Plenary Conference. The Executive Committee saw it otherwise, issuing statements that what it presented was "official" and that the Plenary Conference had no power to veto the proposals. If there was much scratching of heads amongst the "Insiders," most racing fans were initially unconcerned or even unaware of all the fuss. Few had much of an opinion about what was happening.
Needless to say, among those directly involved, opinions varied somewhat. Gerard Larrousse of Renault welcomed and supported the proposals. As did the President of the GPDA, Jody Scheckter. Brian Hart thought the idea of a fuel flow system a load of rubbish. Meanwhile, Keith Duckworth, while delighted at the idea of a fuel flow formula, wondered just what the "orientation" of that formula would wind up being since the flow rate was not announced. As for Nashua, the sponsors whose security guards used "physical violence" on the unsuspecting Balestre and other members of his party as they attempted to reach the South African podium, they explained that it was the race marshals who denied permission to Balestre and company to leave the pit apron to reach the podium steps. In addition, Balestre did not identify himself to the security personnel and attempted to push past them, which resulted in the guards blocking his way. This they say, unleashed a stream of angry French as Balestre lost his temper and cursed the security personnel.
There was a conspicuous silence on the part of the FOCA to all this at first. "No comment," was all that Max Mosley had to say. Others noted that many of the measures presented to the FISA Executive Committee on Tuesday were modified or defeated on Wednesday, there being an obvious split within the FISA Plenary Conference. Indeed, the subject of the Spanish Grand Prix, an event organized by the FOCA, was seen as a direct attack by the FISA and Balestre on the FOCA. Or, the FISA were putting rocks in the cowpies they tossed at the FOCA members.
Oh, by the way, the FISA banned the use of qualifying tyres beginning with the Belgian Grand Prix. This added fuel to the chaos that was always present whenever the racers showed up for the Belgian race at Zolder. It created no end of heartburn for all involved, the pole position of Alan Jones being a question mark long after the final practice was over. Although Jones eventually kept his starting spot on the pole after the nightmare of sorting out his tyres was resolved, he finished second to Didier Pironi in a Ligier Ford Cosworth.
At Zolder, the requirement for mandatory driver meetings took effect. Whatever the GPDA may have said about the meetings, the attendance was, well, sparse. Although rumors abounded that some teams asked their drivers to stay away, others that the FOCA would pay any fines that resulted, and others that they simply "forgot." Keep all this in mind for later on.
There is something about Monaco and the tight confines of Monte Carlo that often brings out the worse in usually well-mannered and reasonable people. Even in 1980, the circuit was woefully inadequate for the machines now racing around its many twists and turns. The cramped, claustrophobic pits put the Great Australian Adjective on the lips of many who labored there. The GPDA was celebrating the start of its 20th season, having been formed in Monte Carlo during the 1961 Grand Prix weekend. More than a few of the members of that organization were unhappy with some of the decisions being made, particularly with the dispensing of the pre-qualification session which had the effect of dumping everybody into the official practice sessions.
This had the odd effect of placing the FISA and the FOCA on the same side of the table but for different reasons. The FISA sided with the organizers and more than a few of the FOCA members reminded the drivers that they weren't the only blokes who could drive racing cars. After a contentious meeting, the FISA and the FOCA both got their way and all 27 drivers would appear in the two official practice sessions to determine who the lucky 20 starters would be. Any mention of the 1972 race and its demands for 25 starters was conspicuously absent.
While practice was the Usual Shambles, the race was marred by a first lap multi-car coming-together at Ste. Devote which eliminated four cars, to include both of the Tyrrell entries. Although Carlos Reutemann won with his Williams FW07 Cosworth Ford, over half the field was not around at the finish. Neither were a few drivers at the mandatory meetings.
After the Monaco Grand Prix, the FISA sent around a notice that those drivers who skipped the meetings had better pay up by the first day of practice for the Spanish Grand Prix at Jarama. Failure to pay the fines could or would result in the driver(s) not being awarded championship points, as well as jeopardizing the running of the Spanish Grand Prix. Those who did not attend the meetings at Zolder or Monte Carlo included: Elio de Angelis (Lotus), Mario Andretti (Lotus), Alan Jones (Williams), Emerson Fittipaldi (Fittipaldi), Jacques Laffite (Ligier), Jean-Pierre "Jumper" Jarier (Tyrrell), Didier Pironi (Ligier), and Alain Prost (McLaren). Absent at Zolder, but present at Monte Carlo were: Jan Lammers (ATS), Tiff Needell (Ensign), Nelson Piquet (Brabham), Carlos Reutemann (Williams), Keke Rosberg (Fittipaldi), John Watson (Williams), and Ricardo Zunino (Brabham). Present at Zolder but absent from the Monte Carlo meeting: Derek Daly (Tyrrell), Jochen Mass (Arrows), and Riccardo Patrese (Arrows).
Of these 18 drivers, several were offered as having been resolved. Andretti had his fine settled by Essex so he could shuffle back and forth between Europe and Indianapolis. Prost was said to have paid his Zolder fine. Maybe. Initially there was more than a little confusion and consternation over this state of affairs. This was followed by the realization by many that a state of war now existed between the FISA and the FOCA.
Meanwhile, the FOCA had submitted its counterproposal to the FISA safety proposals. It proposed an implementation of its plan in two stages. The first stage would be ready by the first European event of 1981 and the second stage a year following that. Its proposal was quite technical and precise. In addition, it addressed the areas pointed out by the FISA, the area surrounding the driver's feet and side impact protection. The FISA chose not to respond to the FOCA submission.
On the eve of the Spanish Grand Prix, the Spanish organizers suddenly found themselves in the midst of a war zone.
In the area southeast of Madrid, some of the most bitter and bloodiest fighting of the Spanish Civil War took place. Therefore, it seemed appropriate that the area was once again the battlefield of what was rapidly escalating into a bitter - and at times quite uncivil - war between the Federation Internationale de Sport Automobile (FISA) and the Formula One Constructors Association (FOCA). This was scarcely what the organizers, spectators, sponsors, and most of the potential participants in the Spanish Grand Prix at the Jarama circuit had in mind for their visit to the Iberian plain.
In retrospect, it seems a bit amazing that this bitter episode in Grand Prix history began with a modest flap over fines for not attending driver meetings. That, however, is merely in retrospect. At the time, many had been anticipating a meltdown over something. It was clear that the driver fines were merely the first thing that came along that Jean-Marie Balestre could put hands on. If not that, then it would have just something else.
The first battle of the FIASCO War was waged in late-May 1980 at Jarama, the early skirmishes having led FISA President Balestre to come to the conclusion that FOCA simply was not getting the message. It was time to marshal the troops and let the FOCA know that the FISA meant business. The hapless organizers caught in the midst of this battle were from the Real Automovil Club España (RACE). Their circuit, their race, their hopes for a modest profit - all wound up being held ransom and at the mercy of others.
The fines owed were distributed thusly:
$7,000 ($2,000 + $5,000) for not attending the meetings at Zolder or Monte Carlo - Elio de Angelis (Lotus), Mario Andretti (Lotus), Alan Jones (Williams), Emerson Fittipaldi (Fittipaldi), Jacques Laffite (Ligier), Jean-Pierre "Jumper" Jarier (Tyrrell), Didier Pironi (Ligier), and Alain Prost (McLaren);
Absent at Zolder, but present at Monte Carlo - Jan Lammers (ATS), Tiff Needell (Ensign), Nelson Piquet (Brabham), Carlos Reutemann (Williams), Keke Rosberg (Fittipaldi), John Watson (Williams), and Ricardo Zunino (Brabham); present at Zolder but absent from the Monte Carlo meeting - Derek Daly (Tyrrell), Jochen Mass (Arrows), and Riccardo Patrese (Arrows); those drivers missing only one meeting were fined $2,000.
The fines were due prior to the start of the first practice session at the Spanish Grand Prix. The FOCA said that the fines were unconstitutional since the motion had not been approved during the FISA meeting in Rio. The FISA responded with the expected retort that the FOCA were quite mistaken and the fines were indeed due and due now. Once it became obvious that the fines were not going to be paid, the FISA requested that the respective Autorite Sportive Nationale (ASN) for each driver not paying the fine rescind the driver's competition license. The French ASN, the FFSA, was only too happy to oblige the request - particularly since Balestre was also the president of this organization.
In the days leading up to the first day of practice on Friday, May 30th, the now openly warring organizations were not in a mood to utter the "C" word - compromise. The FISA was in a combative mood, as some fines had been paid but the vast majority were still outstanding. Likewise, the FOCA was utterly convinced that the fines were not legal and asked the drivers not to pay them. The FISA placed the blame on the FOCA for asking its teams to urge their drivers to not attend the meetings, something Grand Prix Drivers' Association (GPDA) president Jody Scheckter accused FOCA spokesman Bernie Ecclestone of doing so as to provoke a confrontation. Some of the cynics among the crowd noted aloud that Scheckter drove for a team which did not belong to the FOCA, Ferrari.
The FISA insisted that the individual drivers were responsible for paying their own fines and that no one else would undertake that duty - certainly not their team, sponsors, or even race organizers. The latter is significant since the RACE had offered to place a deposit with the FISA in the amount equal to the sum of the fines owed by the drivers. The answer was a firm "NO!" from the FISA to the RACE, who were now having visions of disaster dance before their eyes, since the possibility that the event would not be run was becoming a more distinct possibility each passing day.
On Thursday evening, Balestre unleashed a broadside at the FOCA at a press conference. Balestre made it clear that no one with an outstanding fine would be allowed to practice come the next day. This was exactly what the officials from RACE dreaded to hear. It is at this point that they attempted to place a deposit with the FISA so they could have a race and let the headaches pass on to the next organizers of the next event. Once again, Balestre said that only full payment by the individual drivers would suffice.
It was pointed out by a FOCA member at the press conference that this was rather a case of changing the rules in mid-game since Essex had already paid the fine for Mario Andretti so as to allow him to compete at the Indianapolis 500, an event on the FIA International calendar. Plus, Nelson Piquet had not been turned away from competing at the Nurburgring the previous weekend. Balestre fumbled for a moment, but then said that these had been "mistakes" and that both still owed their fines.
The president of RACE, the Marquis
